Meethack Torino CI/CD Security Risks & CI/CD Goat

A new attack surface

- CI/CD environments, processes and systems are the beating heart of any modern software organization.
- They deliver code from an engineer's workstation to production.
- However, they have also reshaped the *attack surface* with a multitude of new avenues and opportunities for attackers.
- Adversaries are shifting their attention to CI/CD, realizing CI/CD services provide an efficient path to reaching an organization's crown jewels.

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/

Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks


- 1. Insufficient Flow Control Mechanisms
- 2. Inadequate Identity and Access Management
- 3. Dependency Chain Abuse
- 4. Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) Direct (D-PPE) Indirect (I-PPE) Public (3PE)
- 5. Insufficient PBAC (Pipeline-Based Access Controls)
- 6. Insufficient Credential Hygiene
- 7. Insecure System Configuration
- 8. Ungoverned Usage of 3rd Party Services
- 9. Improper Artifact Integrity Validation
- 10. Insufficient Logging and Visibility

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/

Proposed by *Cider Security* (acquired by *Palo Alto Networks*).

Still an OWASP "Lab Project".

CI/CD Goat: our playground



- Things to keep in mind:
 - Builds will start on Jenkins, usually after a *Pull Request (PR)*.
 - PRs can be created between main branch and a newly created branch on Gitea.
 - Jenkins will mask plain text secrets leaked in console output. This will happen in every challenge!
 - Each challenge stands on its own. Do not use access gained in one challenge to solve another challenge.
 - Don't be afraid to look at hints.
 - There is no need to exploit CVEs.

https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat

Just a couple of prerequisites...

git client 101

- Clone a repository (use Gitea credentials):
 - git clone http://localhost:3000/Wonderland/<repository_na me>.git
- Checkout to a new branch:
 - git checkout -b <branch_name>
- Add and commit with message:
 - git commit am "Your message"
- Push to the remote branch:
 - git push -u origin <branch_name>

An example of Jenkinsfile

```
pipeline {
       agent any
       environment {
           PROJECT = "src/urllib3"
       stages {
           stage ('Install Requirements') {
                steps {
                    sh
                         virtualenv venv
                         pip3 install -r requirements.txt || true
           stage ('Lint') {
                steps
                    sh "pylint ${PROJECT} || true"
           stage ('Unit Tests') {
                steps {
25
26
27
                    sh "pytest"
29
30
       post {
           always {
                cleanWs()
33
34
35
```

- Jenkins Pipeline is a suite of plugins which supports implementing and integrating continuous delivery pipelines into Jenkins.
- A continuous delivery (CD) pipeline is an automated expression of your process for getting software from version control right through to your users and customers.
- The definition of a Jenkins Pipeline is written into a text file (called a *Jenkinsfile*) which in turn can be committed to a project's source control repository.
- This is the foundation of *"Pipeline-as-code"*; treating the CD pipeline as a part of the application to be versioned and reviewed like any other code.
- https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/pipeline/

"[...] You take the red pill, you stay in Wonderland, and I show you how deep the rabbit hole goes."

Challenge: White Rabbit - 100

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#White%20Rabbit-1
- Scenario:
 - Use your access to the *Wonderland/white-rabbit* repository to steal the *flag1* secret stored in the Jenkins credential store.
 - Secret is stored with the *Global* scope, which makes it accessible to any pipeline on the Jenkins instance.
 - Jenkinsfile is not protected.
 - https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/pipeline/jenkinsfile/#handling-credentials
- Solution:
 - Direct Poisoned Pipeline Execution (D-PPE)
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/ white-rabbit.md

<u>Challenge: Mad Hatter - 100</u>

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Mad%20Hatter-3
- Scenario:
 - Use your access to the Wonderland/mad-hatter repository to steal the flag3 secret.
 - Jenkinsfile is protected: the pipeline is configured in a separate repository from where the application code is stored at. The attacker doesn't have permission to trigger a pipeline with a modified Jenkinsfile.
- Solution:
 - Indirect Poisoned Pipeline Execution (I-PPE)
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/ solutions/mad-hatter.md

<u>Challenge: Caterpillar - 200</u>

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Caterpillar-2
- Scenario:
 - Use your access to the *Wonderland/caterpillar* repository to steal the *flag2* secret, which is stored in the Jenkins credential store.
 - *Jenkinsfile* is protected: the pipeline is configured in the same repository from where the application code is stored at, but the current user can't change it.
 - There are two jobs in Jenkins: -*prod* and -*test*.
 - Think about this repository like an "open source" one... And escalate your privileges to control it.
- Solution:
 - Public Poisoned Pipeline Execution (3PE)
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/caterpillar.md
 - Considerations about the when condition in the *deploy* stage of the pipeline?
 - You can both: remove the condition for the attack and do it via PR or leave it and push directly on *main* branch instead.

Challenge: Cheshire Cat - 200

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Cheshire%20Cat-5
- Scenario:
 - All jobs in your victim's Jenkins instance run on dedicated nodes. You want to execute code on the Jenkins Controller.
 - Use your access to the Wonderland/cheshire-cat repository to run code on the Controller and steal ~/flag5.txt from its file system.
 - https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/managing/nodes/#components-of-distributed-builds
 - https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/pipeline/syntax/#agent
 - http://localhost:8080/computer/
- Solution:
 - Direct Poisoned Pipeline Execution (D-PPE)
 - Insufficient PBAC (Pipeline-Based Access Controls)
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/cheshire-cat.md
 - Error in the solution: the file name is missing *.txt* extension.

Challenge: Duchess - 100

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Duchess-4
- Scenario:
 - You've got access to the *Wonderland/duchess* repository, which heavily uses Python. There must be some PyPi token left somewhere. Can you find it?
 - The flag is the token.
- Solution:
 - Insufficient Credential Hygiene
 - You could need external tools for this!
 - gitleaks detect -v --enable-rule="pypi-upload-token"
 - docker run -v <full_path_to_host_folder_to_scan>:/path zricethezav/gitleaks:latest detect --source="/path" -v --enablerule="pypi-upload-token"
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/duchess.md

<u>Challenge: Twiddledum - 200</u>

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Twiddledum-6
- Scenario:
 - The flag is under process.env.FLAG6.
 - You can't interact with *Wonderland/Twiddledum repository.*
 - The *Wonderland/Twiddledum* repository is a JS app that uses *Wonderland/Twiddledee* as a dependency. View its *package.json* file.
 - Trying to add pre or post-install scripts with malicious code should fail, as the *Twiddledum* pipeline runs with the --ignore-scripts param.
 - https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v9/using-npm/scripts
- Solution:
 - Dependency Chain Abuse
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/ twiddledum.md

Challenge: Dodo - 200

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Dodo-7
- Scenario:
 - Your mission is to make the *dodo* S3 bucket public-readable without getting caught.
 - The flag will be printed in the job's console output once you're done.
 - *Checkov* (https://github.com/bridgecrewio/checkov) validates that the S3 bucket created by the Terraform code is private, which stops you from making it public.
 - https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs/resources/ s3_bucket_acl
 - https://www.checkov.io/2.Basics/Hard%20and%20soft%20fail.html
- Solution:
 - Insufficient Flow Control Mechanisms
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/dodo.md

Challenge: Dormouse - 300

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Dormouse-9
- Scenario:
 - You can't interact with Wonderland/dormouse repository.
 - The Jenkinsfile uses a reportcov.sh script.
 - Cov/reportcov is a public repository of a 3rd party used by other CI pipelines.
 - It has its own Jenkins job, which you can't view, creating an artifact stored remotely, i.e. *reportcov.sh*.
 - All this can be viewed via the Jenkinsfile.
 - You can't interact with the repository.
- Solution:
 - Ungoverned Usage of 3rd Party Services
 - Improper Artifact Integrity Validation
 - You could need external tools for this!
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/dormouse.md
 - Error in the solution: the command to craft *reportcov.sh* is wrong, here the correct one \rightarrow echo 'echo "\$ {FLAG}" | base64' > reportcov.sh

Challenge: Mock Turtle - 300

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Mock%20Turtle-10
- Scenario:
 - Can you push to the *main* branch of the *Wonderland/mock-turtle* repository? Do what's needed to steal the *flag10* secret stored in the Jenkins credential store.
 - The pipeline is used to automatically merge code into the *main* branch if it introduces just a version bump (stored in the *version* file).
- Solution:
 - Insufficient Flow Control Mechanisms
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/ solutions/mock-turtle.md
 - Pay attention to the \n in *version* file! Be sure to remove them!

Challenge: Hearts - 300

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Hearts-8
- Scenario:
 - You have to exfiltrate *agent* System credentials stored on Jenkins via a user that has privileged access to manage agents.
 - The users in the Jenkins instance are managed by Jenkins' own user database, which lacks basic security controls against various types of attacks, e.g., credentials bruteforce attempts.
 - http://localhost:8080/asynchPeople/
 - https://www.jenkins.io/blog/2022/12/27/run-jenkins-agent-as-a-service/ (Jenkins version is different)
 - http://localhost:8080/computer/
- Solution:
 - Inadequate Identity and Access Management
 - Let's skip the bruteforce part... If you need a password, it's "rockme".
 - You could need external tools for this! To do everything via containers, follow these steps:
 - Launch SSH-MITM with:
 - docker network ls
 - docker run --network=<the_goat_network_name_retrieved_before> --name evil-jenkins-agent -it --rm positronsecurity/ssh-mitm
 - Use evil-jenkins-agent as host and 2222 as port.
 - Check for incoming connections entering in the container:
 - docker exec -it evil-jenkins-agent /bin/bash
 - ls /home/ssh-mitm/log/
 - cat /home/ssh-mitm/log/sftp_session_*.html
 - This doesn't make any sense, but it works...
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/hearts.md

Challenge: Gryphon - 500

- http://localhost:8000/challenges#Gryphon-11
- Scenario:
 - You've compromised GitLab. The compromised user is the maintainer of *pygryphon/pygryphon* package.
 - You can click the "Explore projects" button to view public projects.
 - http://localhost:4000/explore
 - There are also public projects: *Wonderland/nest-of-gold* and *Wonderland/awesome-app* to which you have read-only access.
 - https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/ci/yaml/
 - https://packaging.python.org/en/latest/tutorials/packaging-projects/
 - https://packaging.python.org/en/latest/specifications/pypirc/
 - https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/packages/pypi_repository/#authenticate-with-a-personal-access-token
 - http://localhost:4000/-/profile/personal_access_tokens
- Solution:
 - Dependency Chain Abuse
 - Insufficient Credential Hygiene
 - https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/blob/main/solutions/gryphon.md
 - git clone http://localhost:4000/pygryphon/pygryphon.git
 - Patch the source code and create .pypirc file.
 - python3 -m build
 - Remove existing packages under http://localhost:4000/pygryphon/pygryphon/-/packages
 - python3 -m twine upload -r gitlab --config-file .pypirc --verbose dist/*

Bugged challenge: it fails during the *test* stage! T_T

https://github.com/cider-security-research/cicd-goat/issues/71

